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THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT:
TO INFORM OR NOT TO INFORM?
PAULA WALTER*

Two decades have passed since the New York Legislature
enacted the Medical Malpractice Act (the "Act").1 In a climate of
controversy within the medical and legal communities,' the Act
provided a statutory basis for a lack of informed consent claim,
established standards for disclosure of information to patients by
physicians, and set parameters within which medical providers
must obtain informed consent. Over the years, much scholarly
effort has been directed at determining when and why the transformation from the common law requirement of "consent" to
"informed consent" occurred Academic discussion has also fo" Associate Professor of Law, Baruch College, The City University of New York.
Professor Walter has previously published an article with the St. John's Law Review
entitled, The Commercial ImpracticabilityDefense-The Emperor's New Clothes in
the Law of Contracts, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 225 (1987), and is currently working on
an article concerning informed consent and medical experimentation with the mentally incompetent.
Effective in 1975, the New York Legislature enacted Chapter 109, entitled
"Medical Malpractice." This statute was added to the Public Health Law as section
2805-d, which is entitled "Limitation of medical malpractice action based on lack of
informed consent."
2 For a discussion of the environment in which the Act was passed, see Peter
V.
Coffey, Assault on Informed Consent, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 447 (1976). In an article written for practitioners, the author opines that the legislation was enacted "in a state
of near hysteria over the rising cost of medical malpractice insurance and its assumed consequences [and] virtually abolish[es] the patient's right to receive information in advance of surgery." Id. at 447. Coffey further states:
It is the opinion of this writer, therefore, that although the 1975 legislation
labeled the action 'medical malpractice' and although the action is substantially altered, it remains an action based upon trespass or assault and
not upon negligence. The decisions of the courts of this state in interpreting the new legislation will rest largely upon whether the courts adhere
rigidly to their former approach or whether they 'base their judgments
upon broad considerations of policy' as set forth in the legislative principles
enunciated in Chapter 109.
Id. at 479.
3The passage of the New York statute was seen by many commentators as a
necessary reaction to a trend in the development of case law that had become overly
consumer friendly and exceedingly plaintiff oriented. See Stephen Zuckerman et al.,
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cused on whether the cause of action for a failure to obtain informed consent is grounded in contract law,4 fiduciary law,' negligence or intentional tort law.6 Since the enactment of the Act
in 1975, these discussions have been muted in New York State,
but language in cases subsequent to its passage still harks back
to that earlier controversy.
With the advantage of hindsight provided by a twenty year
time prism, together with a significant number of appellate-level
Information on Malpractice:A Review of EmpiricalResearch on MajorPolicy Issues,
49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 91-94 (1986) (discussing increases in claims and
award amounts during 1970's). Still, others believe that the medical malpractice
statute was passed in order to thwart what was seen as a trend towards strict liability in medical malpractice litigation. See, e.g., Ronald K. Fierstein, Note, Who's
Afraid of Informed Consent? An Affirmative Approach to the Medical Malpractice
Crisis, 44 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 242-43 (1978) (discussing then current trend of imposing liability upon medical community for non-negligently causing harm). To others, the enactment of the statute was seen as the legislature's effort to abolish the
patient's right to receive information. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy
Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REv. 137, 141 (1977) [hereinafter Law's Vision]
(arguing that principle of self-determination is given little mindfulness because
judges, who do not inquire into physician-patient dialogue or into quality of consent,
are ambivalent towards patients' right to individual choice).
' Although the doctor-patient relationship is based on the patient's purchase of
the physician's services, these services were always viewed as distinct from ordinary
commercial services. See P.S. Atiyah, Medical Malpractice and the Contract/Tort
Boundary, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287, 292 (1986). A medical malpractice claim
is a claim for recovery of damages for injuries sustained as a result of a medical
treatment. Issues relating to the nature of the physician-patient relationship involve questions of foreseeable risk and unforeseeable accidents. These questions
have engendered debate as to whether this relationship is or should be governed by
contract law or tort law. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice,Imperfect Information, and the ContractualFoundationfor Medical Services, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 201 (1986) (suggesting tort doctrine embracing informed consent
requirements should allow doctors and patients to alter prescribed regulations by
private agreement); Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 87, 91-96 (1976) (opining that consensual relationships such as that between doctor and patient should be governed by contract
law); A.J. Miller, The ContractualLiability of Physiciansand Surgeons, 1953 WASH.
U. L.Q. 413, 435 (1953) ("The history of malpractice actions shows the theories of
tort and breach of implied contract to be inextricably bound up together.").
' See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor:An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 892-902 (1988) (recognizing situation-specific motions of
fiduciary obligations); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 802
(1983) (observing reliance on fiduciary law as replacement for weakened social controls); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on BargainingBetween Patientsand Health Care Providers,51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 367 (1990) ("The
patient's need for information ... triggers the operation of fiduciary rules.").
6 See generally Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusions Into the Common Law of
Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35
SYRACUSE L. REV. 939 (1984).
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decisions, a retrospective of what has transpired in this area is
proper. Appropriately, this article will examine the case law in
the field of informed consent in order to analyze the ultimate effects of the Act and to determine whether any markers or guideposts for both physicians and patients have been created by this
statutory map. In this context, this article will determine
whether the statute has weaved a path of accommodation between doctor and patient or whether medical paternalism continues, and whether the legislation has been consumer friendly.
This article, in Part I, will begin by analyzing the philosophical underpinnings upon which the legal assumptions of the
doctrine of informed consent are predicated. Part II will examine the provisions of the statute, while Part III will scrutinize
the case law interpretation of the legislation. Finally, Part IV
concludes with an examination of the postulates yielded by cases
in the area of informed consent.
I.

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED
CONSENT

The concept of self-determination, which assures that man is
master of his destiny, is deeply rooted in our legal system and is
the legal mirror of the Western values system, which exalts the
individual.7 Judge Benjamin Cardozo expounded the concept of
self-determination in Schloendorff v. New York Hospital8 by
noting that "[elvery human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done to his body."9 Based
on this statement of principle, judicial decisions have spawned
the legal principles of consent, which eventually developed into
the doctrine of informed consent. ° The doctrine has evolved to
7 See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) ("Anglo-American law
starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It follows that each

man is considered to be master of his own body ...."). Recent examples of the recog-

nition of the principle of self-determination are expressed in abortion and right-todie cases. The Supreme Court has interpreted the liberty interest as embracing the
ideas of physical freedom and self-determination. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 288 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted)
("[F]orced treatment may burden [an] individual's liberty interest[] as much as any
state coercion.") (citations omitted).
8 211 N.Y. 125 (1914), overruled in part by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656 (1957).
'Id. at 129.
'0 Patients have been required to give consent to medical treatment since 1880.
See State v. Housekeeper, 16 A. 382, 384 (Md. 1889) (noting that surgeon is justified
in performing operation with consent of patient). Early cases held that an unauthor-
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reflect strong judicial deference for individual autonomy-that
is, the belief that an individual has the right to be free from nonconsensual interference with his or her person.11 This fundamental principle of autonomy incorporates the notion that a person has the right to control his or her choice.12 In the medical
context, the concept of autonomy translates into an understanding that the individual has an unfettered right to choose the
course of medical treatment, including the right not to pursue
treatment and to desist from any treatment where such medical
protocol has already been initiated. By corollary, this precept
implies that the decision of the patient will be respected.
At the same time that the medical provider must respect the
autonomy of the patient, the Hippocratic Oath 4 and the physiized treatment was a battery committed upon the patient. Negligence has now generally replaced battery as the basis for liability in medical malpractice cases. See
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979) ("If treatment is completely unauthorized and performed without any consent at all, there has been a battery. However, if a physician obtains a patient's consent but has breached his duty to inform,
the patient has a cause of action sounding in negligence .... "). The idea that physicians are obligated to seek assistance in the decision-making process evolved further
in the 1960's. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1103 (noting that physician who fails to reveal likely consequences of treatment may be subjected to claim of unauthorized
treatment). The Natanson court held that the basis of liability was "the deviation
from the standard of conduct of a reasonable and prudent medical doctor of the
same school of practice as the defendant under similar circumstances." Id. at 1107.
" See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his
own person from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.")).
12 The principle of autonomy emanates from the penumbras of the
Bill of Rights.
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."). The Supreme Court's decisions have demarcated a
"private realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). The liberty to make choices concerning one's private life
is fundamental to our "concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). Furthermore, the Court has recognized that the relationship between doctor and patient is
often encompassed within the domain of private life protected by the Due Process
Clause. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).
13 Competent individuals have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284
(recognizing right to terminate life-sustaining hydration and nutrition treatment).
The right to refuse medical treatment is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, which states: "[No] State shall deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
14 The Hippocratic Oath is the statement: "I swear by Apollo and Aesculepius
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cian's training obligate the physician to provide medical care to
those who seek his services. Specifically, the medical provider is
guided by the principle of beneficence, which dictates that the
physician actually contribute to the patient's health rather than
merely avoid harm. 5 The principle of beneficence competes with
the principle of autonomy by requiring the physician to use his
training to decide the best treatment of his patient, who may in
fact prefer a different medical treatment. In an ideal setting,
these two competing values do not collide. In reality, however,
the principles of autonomy and beneficence do collide. 16 As a result, problems arise in allocating authority for treatment between the physician and the patient.
The doctrine of informed consent was developed to accommodate these tensions. The doctrine imposes two independent
duties on the medical provider: first, the medical practitioner has
a duty to disclose information; and second, the practitioner has
an obligation to obtain an informed consent from the patient. 7
In order to grant an informed consent, the patient (1) must be
competent, (2) must understand the information conveyed, and
(3) must voluntarily give his consent free from coercion." The informed consent doctrine envisages a joint decision-making process in which the physician digests the technical information for
that I will follow that system of regimen which according to my ability and judgment
I consider for the benefit of my patients .... " Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must it
Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 73 (1994) [hereinafter
FairyTale].
The principle of beneficence imposes "the duty to help others further their
important and legitimate interests ... to confer benefits and actively to prevent and
remove harms ... and to balance possible goods against the possible harms of an action." Fairy Tale, supra note 14, at 83 (citing THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS, 148-49 (2d ed. 1983)).
'6 For an excellent discussion on the interplay between the two principles of
autonomy and beneficence, see Law's Vision, supra note 3; Fairy Tale, supra note
14; Jon F. Merz, On a Decision-MakingParadigmof Medical Informed Consent, 14
J. LEGAL MED. 231 (1993); Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy
with EthicalTheory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749 (1986).
Compromise
,"See N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 1993).
'8 Some commentators question the very premise upon which the informed consent doctrine is predicated and argue that the law disregards or remains unaware of
the cognitive limitations on both the practitioner and the patient. See, e.g., J.F.
Merz & B. Fischoff, Informed Consent Does Not Mean Rational Consent, Cognitive
Limitations on Decision-Making,11 J. LEGAL MED. 321, 340 (1990); see also Bruce J.
Winick, Competency To Consent To Treatment: The DistinctionBetween Assent and
Objection, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 15, 16 (1991) (noting that elements of informed consent
include "disclosure of information, competency, understanding, voluntariness, and
decision making").
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the patient and transmits this information in a manner comprehensible by a layperson. 9 The patient, in turn, asks questions,
evaluates the information conveyed, and agrees to either proceed
or not to proceed with the recommended treatment.
Although the role of the physician as a professional with the
ability to understand such technical information is clearly within
the purview of the doctrine, an issue remains as to whether the
doctrine considers the patient's cognitive abilities. A related
question is whether the doctrine merely seeks to assess the patient's ability to understand rather than attempting to examine
the patient's actual understanding of the medical issues. 0 Many
physicians are skeptical that the patient can even begin to understand the technical intricacies of a medical diagnosis and its
concomitant protocols of treatment. In New York, the Act assumes that the patient is competent and that his decisions are
not subject to pressure.2' In certain circumstances, however, the
patient may feel frightened and confused, and consequently he
may focus his resources entirely on the physician selection process and may ultimately defer further medical decisions to the
physician.22 In this instance, medical providers are perceived by
'9 Even cases that are most supportive of the plaintiff have stated "[flirst, the
patient's interest in information does not extend to a lengthy polysyllabic discourse
on all possible complications [and a] mini-course in medical science is not required
.... Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
20 The inequality of the physician-patient relationship
stems from the physician's superior knowledge of medicine and the patient's need for care. See Marjorie
M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient's Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95
YALE L.J. 219, 221-22 (1985) (discussing how patient's lack of technical ability to
make medical decisions and expertise of doctors are justifications for doctors' preempting patient's authority). The doctrine of informed consent seeks to minimize
the inequality in this relationship. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1
(Cal. 1972); Salgo v. Leland Stanford Univ., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1957); Natanson v.
Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
If the function of the informed consent doctrine is to protect a patient's right to
make a "personal decision," then there must be safeguards to assure that doctors
are providing adequate information. If, however, the goal is to ensure "rational" decisions, then a patient's level of understanding becomes critical. See Alan Meisel,
The Expansion of Liability For MedicalAccidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability By Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51, 117-21 (1977).
Section 2805-d speaks of a "knowledgeable" or a "reasonably prudent person."
§ 2805-d(1), (3). Thus, the notion of an incompetent person is not encompassed
within this provision.
22 See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 442 (Cal. 1963)
(involving patient who was in pain, sedated, and unable to comprehend hospital's
waiver form).
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some to bear an inherent conflict of interest, especially in a system that remunerates the provider on a fee-for-service basis."
Since a physician is trained to enhance the patient's health,
it appears that he will usually seek to achieve that goal. With
such an obligation, how can the physician agree with the competent patient's rational decision to refuse treatment? Can the
physician be required to concur with the patient when their respective expectations for treatment, including non-treatment,
collide? To what extent will the doctrine of informed consent
mandate the medical practitioner to respect the autonomous
choices or acts of his patients? The New York Legislature attempted to resolve these questions by providing for a statutory
mandate of informed consent. Section 2805-d of the New York
Public Health Law defines the contours of the informed consent
doctrine.
II. NEW YORK PUBLIC HEALTH LAw § 2805-d
In 1975, the New York Legislature enacted the Medical
Malpractice Act in an attempt to simplify the existing common
law doctrine of informed consent.2 4 This Act sets forth a statutory cause of action that is separate and distinct from medical
malpractice2 for patients injured in a non-emergency medical
procedure for which the medical provider failed to obtain informed consent.
A.

"Informed Consent" Defined
Lack of informed consent is defined in section 2805-d(1) as:
the failure of the person providing the professional treatment or
diagnosis to disclose to the patient such alternatives thereto and
the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable medical, dental or podiatric practitioner under similar
circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the
patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation.26

2 See Theodore J. Schneyer, Informed Consent and the Danger of Bias in the
Formation of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 124, 164 (1976)

(noting that economic pressures may alter physician's disclosure).
24 See Williams v. Cordice, 418 N.Y.S.2d 995, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1979)
(reviewing prestatutory confusion as to legal basis of cause of action for lack of informed consent).
""See Pan v. Coburn, 463 N.Y.S.2d 223 (App. Div. 1983); Bellier v. Bazan, 478
N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Pagan v. State, 476 N.Y.S.2d 468 (Ct. Cl. 1984).
26 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney
1993).
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The Legislature has outlined the elements of an informed consent that must be satisfied in order to form an unassailable consent. This language mandates that the provider is not required
to provide full disclosure of all alternatives and risks.27 The onus
is placed on the medical provider to disclose only the alternatives
of the suggested treatment or diagnosis and its "reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits." As Part III of this Article will demonstrate, case law assists in deciphering which risks are
"foreseeable" and therefore subject to disclosure under the statute.28
The treating physician does not decide which risks are material enough to disclose but rather, the scope of the disclosure is
governed by what a reasonable practitioner "under similar circumstances would have disclosed." This objective standard requires expert testimony concerning the degree and quality of information that the particular medical provider should have
provided to his patient under the circumstances. 29 The standard
of the medical community is determinative of the scope of materiality for disclosure.
Similarly, the reasonableness of the disclosure is not judged
by whether the patient himself actually understood the alternatives and risks as explained to him. However, in order to mitigate the severity of the objective standard, the New York Legislature introduced the qualifying requirement that the
information transmitted to the patient be made "in a manner
permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation."
Hence, in cases where a reasonably prudent physician in similar
circumstances would not have given the patient information
other than that which the particular physician provided, the
217

See Chapman v. State, 468 N.Y.S.2d 792, 792 (App. Div. 1983) (finding no

need for physician to discuss alternative procedures if they would not be productive); Troy v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 446 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349-50 (App.
Div. 1982) (finding error in trial court's charge to jury that doctor must describe
"all" available options).
28 See infra Part III.
29 See Koller v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 563 N.Y.S.2d 497, 498-99
(App. Div. 1990) (finding that section 2805-d(1) is satisfied by medical testimony
showing that proper informed consent would have required doctor to advise patient
of risk of double vision resulting from surgery); Gonzalez v. Moscarella, 530
N.Y.S.2d 218, 219 (App. Div. 1988) (requiring expert medical testimony to support
qualitative sufficiency of disclosure); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4401-a (McKinney 1993)
(providing for summary judgment for failure to produce expert testimony as to
qualitative sufficiency of disclosure).
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physician must convey the information in a manner that will allow the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation." It appears that the legislature understood that removing patient input in toto would emasculate the notion of informed consent. In
essence, under the statute, the entire process-the give and take
between doctor and patient-is examined. 3 It is in this manner
that the statute strikes a balance between the two competing
values of self-determination and beneficence.
B. Limitations on the Duty to Disclose
In section 2805-d(2), the legislature grants a cause of action
for malpractice based on lack of informed consent in cases involving either "non-emergency treatment, procedure or surgery" or
procedures that involve "invasion or disruption of the integrity of
the body."3 2 With the benefit of an earlier New York case, Sullivan v. Montgomery,33 the term "emergency" has been understood
to include both the endangerment of life or health and the need
for alleviation of pain.'
The second-half of section 2805-d(2) is of particular import.
Therein, the legislature clarified that a cause of action can lie
where the procedure "involved invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body." Accordingly, section 2805-d(2) has shut the
"0See Nisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 568, 571-72 (Sup. Ct.
1984) (requiring that description of potential complications be detailed enough so
reasonably prudent patient can assess chances of harm and decide whether to give
his consent).
3' See generally Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561 (App. Div. 1980) (noting that
focus must be on doctor's duty to communicate with patient); Zeleznik v. Jewish
Chronic Disease Hosp., 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (App. Div. 1975) (stating that doctrine of
informed consent is based upon patient's right to control his body and such right is
not at sole disposal of medical community).
32 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(2) (McKinney 1993). Section 2805-d(2) states
that "[tihe right of action to recover for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice
based on a lack of informed consent is limited to those cases involving either (a) nonemergency treatment, procedure or surgery, or (b) a diagnostic procedure which involved invasion or disruption of the integrity of the body."
"279 N.Y.S. 575 (City Ct. 1935).
24 See id. at 577. The rationale of the Sullivan court
is as follows:
To hold that a physician or surgeon must wait until perhaps he may be
able to secure the consent of the parents, who may not be available, before
administering an anesthetic or giving to the person injured the benefit of
his skill and learning, to the end that pain and suffering may be alleviated,
may result in the loss of many lives and pain and suffering which might
otherwise be prevented.
Id. at 577.
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door to any claim advanced by a plaintiff who seeks compensation for a non-physical injury. Now, in order to make out a
prima facie case in negligence, the plaintiff-patient must adduce
evidence of an actual injury. 5 Consequently, claims brought to
rectify an insult to a person's dignity are not permitted if
couched in malpractice terms because the statute will not permit
redress for such injuries in the absence of a physical harm.3 8
This is an important distinction which is derived from earlier
cases that clarified the difference between negligence and battery causes of action.
In those earlier cases, a physician who simply touched a patient without first obtaining the patient's consent was guilty of
battery and the patient could recover against that medical provider. 8 The tort of battery is completed at the moment of the
nonconsensual touching.3 9 Whether the plaintiff is appropriately
treated by such touching or whether the patient's welfare is actually enhanced are irrelevant questions." The affront is to the
person's dignity because his consent was not voluntarily given."
In such cases, the courts were addressing this outrage to the pa-

3' See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§

30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984) (reviewing elements of cause of action in negligence).
36 See Bernard v. Block, 575 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (App. Div. 1991) (holding that
lack of informed consent claim requires plaintiff to prove that treatment was proximate cause of injury); Flores v. Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 490 N.Y.S.2d 770, 772
(App. Div. 1985) ("It must be proven ... that the plaintiff in fact suffered an injury
which medically was caused by the treatment.").
37 See infra Part IIIa (discussing medical malpractice action and whether
this
cause of action is rooted in common law battery or negligence); see also Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (Minn. 1905) (expressing right to inviolability of the person
as "necessarily forbid[ding] a physician or surgeon, however skillful or eminent, who
has been asked to examine, diagnose, advise and prescribe ... to violate, without
permission, the bodily integrity of his patient ... ) (quoting Pratt v. Davis, 37 CHI.
LEG. NEWS 213)).
38 In Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125 (1914), Judge Cardozo
held that "a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent,
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. at 129-30; see also Mohr,
104 N.W. at 14 (stating that doctor who performed surgical operation without consent of patient can be held liable in civil action for assault and battery).
'9 Battery is defimed as "[a] harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting
from an act intended to cause the plaintiff ... to suffer such a contact .... W.
W PAGE
KEETON, supra note 35, at 39 (emphasis added).
4' If treatment was given without the informed consent of the patient, the medical provider is liable no matter how skillfully he administered the treatment. See
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (Kan. 1960).
41 See generally supra note 10 (discussing development of informed
consent doctrine).
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tient's person.
C. Causation
Once a plaintiff proves a lack of informed consent in a
situation that does not fall within a statutory exception, he must
further prove that such inadequate disclosure was both the actual and proximate cause of his injury. Section 2805-d(3) sets
forth the causal requirements as follows:
For a cause of action therefor [sic] it must also be established
that a reasonably prudent person in the patient's position would
not have undergone the treatment or diagnosis if he had been
fully informed and that the lack of informed consent is a proximate cause
of the injury or condition for which recovery is
42
sought.
Hence, New York imposes a two-fold burden on the plaintiffpatient. First, the plaintiff must adduce evidence that a reasonably prudent person in his position would not have proceeded
with the treatment had the physician adequately disclosed the
attendant risks. Again, the issue is not whether the patient
himself would have refused treatment given full disclosure; instead, the statute creates yet another objective standard of the
reasonably prudent patient.4 3
Second, the plaintiff must prove that the defendantphysician's failure to disclose was the proximate cause of the injury for which damages are sought. The question of proximate
causation in a medical malpractice context is defined as a conclusive finding that the injuries complained of would not have
42 N.Y.

PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(3) (McKinney 1993).

43This objective standard within the statute effectively cut off the trend in the
pro-patient, consumer-oriented case law that sought to safeguard the right of individual choice, including the right to make an unreasonable choice. See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979) (using subjective standard for causation). "If the
patient would have elected to proceed with treatment had he been duly informed of
its risks, then the element of causation is missing." Id. (emphasis added). The Bradford court believed that under a "reasonable man" approach, "a patient's right of
self-determination is irrevocably lost." Id at 559; see MacPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d
892, 897 (N.C. 1982) (same). The subjective standard is no longer applied and the
patient's credibility is now questioned. The potential difficulty of exposing selfserving falsehood outweighs the patient's right to self-determination. As a result,
the objective standard has substituted the subjective standard with the consequence
that the new standard may contradict the patient's right to self-determination when
his decision deviates from the judgment of the hypothetical "reasonable" or
"prudent" person, as though there is one such prudent person response. See infra
notes 155-72 and accompanying text.
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occurred "but for" the doctor's failure to inform the patient of the
attendant risks." The plaintiff is not required to establish, for
example, that had he elected the treatment option of which he
was not advised, the body organ would have been saved.4 5
Rather, the issue is whether the negligence of the physician deprived the plaintiff of "a substantial possibility of cure or recov46
ery."
By setting forth an objective test, phrased in terms of the
"reasonably prudent person in the patient's position," the legislature has clearly indicated that despite its concern for victims of
medical malpractice, it will not permit a patient's hindsight to
influence his testimony at trial or to sway the jury.4 7 Why, however, foreclose the patient's autonomous choices in the name of
the hypothetical "reasonably prudent person?" Rather than
granting to the patient a right with one hand and then taking
that same right away with the other hand, it appears that imposing a stricter standard of proof to be met by the plaintiff would
be more equitable and reasonable.
D. Defenses
Section 2805-d(4)48 of the statute includes four circumstances
44 New York cases that have accepted the "but for" test of proximate cause
in-

clude: Bernard v. Block, 575 N.Y.S.2d 506 (App. Div. 1991) (concerning myelogram
and multiple sclerosis); Flores v. Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 490 N.Y.S.2d 770
(App. Div. 1985) (involving administration of oxygen to premature baby); Dries v.
Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561 (App. Div. 1980) (concerning excision of breast tissue).
"' See Crisher v. Spak, 471 N.Y.S.2d 741, 745 (Sup. Ct. 1983) ("Certainly, the
plaintiff is not required to establish that, without question, her leg would have been
saved .... ").
46 See id. ('The issue, rather, is whether or not the negligence
of the defendants
deprived [plaintiff] of an appreciable chance of avoiding amputation.").
' See Law's Vision, supra note 3, at 163 (noting that objective test prevents patient's testimony from being influenced by "hindsight and bitterness").
48 Section 2805-d(4)
states:
It shall be a defense to any action for medical, dental or podiatric malpractice based upon an alleged failure to obtain such an informed consent that:
(a) the risk not disclosed is too commonly known to warrant disclosure; or
(b) the patient assured the medical, dental or podiatric practitioner he
would undergo the treatment, procedure or diagnosis regardless of the
risk involved, or the patient assured the medical, dental or podiatric
practitioner that he did not want to be informed of the matters to
which he would be entitled to be informed; or
(c) consent by or on behalf of the patient was not reasonably possible;
or
(d) the medical, dental or podiatric practitioner, after considering all of
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where the medical provider has a defense to a claim that disclosure was necessary. First, a medical provider may raise a defense to an action for medical malpractice if the risk that was not
disclosed is "too commonly known to warrant disclosure."49 Second, an exception to section 2805-d(2) exists if the patient assured the medical provider that he would undergo the treatment
"regardless of the risk involved" or that he did not want to be informed of a matter that otherwise would have to be disclosed."
Third, if "consent by or on behalf of the patient was not reasonably possible," the medical provider is excused from liability.51
Finally, the medical provider is not liable if, after appraising all
of the "attendant facts and circumstances," he used "reasonable
discretion" as to the manner and extent of the disclosure because
"he reasonably believed that the manner and extent of such disclosure could reasonably be expected to adversely and substantially affect the patient's condition."52
Section 2805-d(4) recognizes the notion that the medical
provider should be permitted to proceed without first obtaining
the patient's consent in those instances where non-disclosure is
reasonable. These defenses are rooted in the understanding that
the physician-patient relationship is unique.53 This special relationship allows the doctor to proceed with treatment without
first obtaining the consent of his patient.
The last defense, known as the "therapeutic defense," permits the medical provider to argue that since disclosure would
have impacted negatively on the patient, information was withheld for the benefit and protection of the patient.54 Some comthe attendant facts and circumstances, used reasonable discretion as
to the manner and extent to which such alternatives or risks were
disclosed to the patient because he reasonably believed that the manner and extent of such disclosure could reasonably be expected to adversely and substantially affect the patient's condition.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(4) (McKinney 1993).
49 § 2805-d(4)(a).
50§ 2805-d(4)(b).
5' § 2805-d(4)(c).
52 § 2805-d(4)(d).
0 See supra note 5 (discussing how physician-patient relationship partakes of
fiduciary nature).
' Section 2805-d(4)(d) provides an affirmative defense to the physician in that
he acknowledges the lack of disclosure but can defend against liability if he
"reasonably believed that the manner and extent of such disclosure could reasonably
be expected to adversely and substantially affect the patient's condition." N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(4)(d). The statute appears to have simply codified a defense
recognized at common law. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.
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mentators suggest that the therapeutic defense undermines the
essence of the informed consent doctrine since it allows the physician to arrogate the decision-making process to himself instead
of encouraging a joint decision-making relationship between the
concerned parties.5 5 If the goal of the informed consent doctrine
is to permit the patient to determine the course of his medical
future, why minimize his personal judgment? It appears that
the statute5' 6is implicitly telling the patient, "we don't' trust your
judgment.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION

2805-d

A. Is an Action for Lack of Informed Consent Grounded in
Common Law Assault and Battery or Negligence?
At common law, a majority of jurisdictions recognized that
the nonconsensual touching of a patient by a doctor constituted
an assault and battery.57 In New York, the etiology of that view
1972) ("The critical inquiry is whether the physician responded to a sound medical
judgment that communication of the risk information would present a threat to the
patient's well-being.").
55 See Alan Meisel, The "Exceptions"to the Informed Consent Doctrine:Striking
a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking,1979 Wis. L. REV.
413 (1979). Professor Meisel argues that societal and professional interests combine
to place responsibility for the promotion of health on the medical profession and not
on the individual. Id. at 429. This responsibility is misplaced. Id. In fact, he argues
that the threat posed by this "therapeutic privilege" to self-determination is so great
that its abolition should be considered:
Harm is inflicted upon the patient by undermining his right of selfdetermination when information is withheld as certainly as harm is done
by emotionally upsetting him when unpleasant information is conveyed ....
But when viewed in light of the great weight accorded individualism and
the consequent heavy burden on those who would deny it, the need for a
restrictively defined and applied therapeutic privilege is apparent.
Id. at 469.
5' See Meisel, supra note 55, at 461. It appears that the legislature, by way of
section 2805-d(4)(d), agrees that societal health is best provided by those whose
primary duty is to do that which is beneficial for the patient.
g See, e.g., Pratt v. Davis, 118 Ill. App. 161, 166 (App. Ct. 1905) (holding that
surgeon does not have right to violate person of patient by performing serious operation without express or implied consent).
[U]nder a free government at least, the free citizen's first and greatest
right, which underlies all others-the right to the inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to himself-is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however
skillful or eminent ... to violate without permission the bodily integrity of
his patient ... and operat[e] on him without his consent or knowledge.
Id.; see also Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 15-16 (Minn. 1905) (dealing with cause
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5 8 in which
can be traced to Schloendorff v. New York Hospital,
Judge Cardozo emphatically stated that the mere fact of touching, without an examination of any other factor, was actionable
in battery.59 An implication of this legal predicate is that negligence is not the issue. Thus, under this common law rule, even
in those instances where the medical provider's care is superb
and cannot be faulted on a theory of negligence-that is, the deviation from the minimum standard of care exercised by the reasonably prudent practitioner in similar circumstances-the theory of battery will be a successful basis for the plaintiffs
recovery of damages."
With time, cases arose in which plaintiffs who gave consent
to medical procedures later argued that their consent was defective because all risks were not fully disclosed.61 The next logical
argument to be advanced was that this defective consent, based
as it was on incomplete information, was the legal equivalent of
no consent.62 This argument was accepted in the case law on a
theory of battery.63
With the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Act, an issue
arose as to how the statute impacted on this battery-negligence
dichotomy. In 1980, two cases moved New York law towards a
theory of negligence. In Dries v. Gregor,' an Appellate Division
decision, the plaintiff Dries launched a cause of action alleging
malpractice arising from a lack of informed consent. 65 Based on

of action for assault and battery); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559
(App Div. 1973) (same).
211 N.Y. 125 (1914).
" Id. at 130.
€ See Fogal, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 559 ("The cause of action is not based on any theory of negligence but is an offshoot of the law of assault and battery."); see also Darrah v. Kite, 301 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290-91 (App. Div. 1969) (finding that injury is that
surgeon performed at all, not that surgeon performed incorrectly).
See Fiorentino v. Wenger, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557, 559 (App. Div. 1966) (holding
that surgeon was obligated to disclose that procedure he proposed was novel and
unorthodox), rev'd on other grounds, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).
2 See Darrah,301 N.Y.S.2d at 290 ("An uninformed or invalid consent is tantamount to no consent at all.").
See generally Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30
(1914) (holding doctors who perform operations on patients without consent are liable for assault); Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (App. Div. 1977)
(discussing pre-statute common law); Darrah,301 N.Y.S.2d at 290 (extending doctor
liability under assault to include situations where patient is unable to make informed consent).
6 424 N.Y.S.2d 561 (App. Div. 1980).
65Id. at 562.
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a radiologist's X-ray report that revealed a positive finding of a
lesion on plaintiffs right breast, plaintiff agreed to a biopsy of
the breast in order to rule out cancer.66 During the procedure, a
partial mastectomy was performed and a substantial amount of
breast tissue, which was later found to be benign, was removed.67
The plaintiff stated in her complaint that "she was neither advised of nor had she consented to" the partial mastectomy procedure.68 The court reviewed at length the two legal theories of liability arising from a lack of informed consent-battery and
negligence.69 The court discussed the academic writings on the
subject that found that the use of assault and battery concepts
were declining while use of negligence concepts were on the
rise.7" Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals was persuaded to
adopt a negligence standard of review. 7 The court reasoned that
assault and battery are intentional torts and, as such, do not
logically apply to situations where a doctor unintentionally fails
to disclose adequate information.72 Injuries claimed in lack of
consent actions do not arise from an intended harm; rather, they
are caused by the doctor's breach of duty to adequately inform.
The court therefore concluded that "[firom a practical standpoint, the conduct of the parties should be measured by a negligence analysis in both 'informed consent' and 'negligent' malpractice actions."7 3 Lower courts continued to echo this theme.74
66

Id. at 563.

67 id.
68 id.

69Id. at 563 ("The theory of lack of informed consent in medical malpractice
actions presents conceptual difficulties arising from the awkward mixture of assault
and battery in a suit based upon negligence.").
70 Id. at 564 (citing to Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisalof Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381, 416-24 (1957)).
71 Id.
(adopting negligence standard because "medical treatment beyond the
scope of a patient's consent should not be considered as an intentional tort or species of assault and battery as it had been viewed in the past .... ").
72 Indeed, a doctor is one who "in good faith intends to confer a benefit on the
patient." Id.
7 id.

7 See, e.g., Rigie v. Goldman, 543 N.Y.S.2d 983, 986 (Sup. Ct. 1989)
(acknowledging modern view that failure of doctor to obtain informed consent is
type of malpractice resting in negligence); Bellier v. Bazan, 478 N.Y.S.2d 562, 565
(Sup. Ct. 1984) (affirming award against defendants in medical malpractice action
where physician was shown to have deviated from proper standards of good medical
practice); Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (Sup. Ct. 1983)
(recognizing mother's right to bring cause of action for negligence against physician
who failed to obtain informed consent from mother on behalf of infant).
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In Prooth v. Wallsh," the court examined two theories of liability-assault and battery and negligence-in a medical malpractice action wherein plaintiff claimed that his consent to surgery was vitiated because he was not properly informed of the
risks of heart by-pass surgery.76 During the surgery, a surgical
clamp was "inadvertently left in [the patient's] chest cavity.""
During the course of the operation, the surgeons discovered that
a clamp was missing, but because of the plaintiff's erratic heartbeat, they were unable to continue searching the plaintiffs chest
cavity for the clamp.7" The court, citing to the Dries7 9 case, noted:
"the trend has been toward adoption of a standard applied in
other jurisdictions which considers the failure to properly inform
the patients of the risks of the operation to be negligence, a lack
of due care, within the general principles of professional malpractice."80 The battery versus negligence debate has been laid
to rest. Today, all causes of action for lack of informed consent
in New York are based solely on a theory of negligence.81
B.

Who Must Obtain Consent?

The statute requires the "medical, dental or podiatric practitioner" to obtain the patient's informed consent.82 At common
law, the doctrine of informed consent was applied to doctors and
dentists. 8 The 1975 Act extended the coverage of the doctrine to
include podiatrists.' A significant volume of case law has
7'432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
76Id. at 664. The two theories examined by the court were the traditional assault and battery claim for non-consensual contact and the then developing theory
of negligence grounded in a breach of duty to inform. Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 667.
78Id.
79For a discussion of the Dries case, see supra notes 64-73 and accompanying
text. Prooth
v. Wallsh, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664 (Sup.
Ct. 1980) (citing Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561 (App. Div. 1980)); see also Murriello v. Crapotta, 382 N.Y.S.2d
513, 514 (App. Div. 1976) (finding that claim for lack of informed consent is more
consonant with negligence principles than with assault and battery).
81 See, e.g., Vargas v. Rosal-Arcillas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 986 (Sup. Ct. 1981). For an
outline of the decline of the battery theory, see Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d
710, 710-12 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
82 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1) (McKinney
1993).
8 See Petterson v. Lynch, 299 N.Y.S.2d 244, 245 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding that
informed consent theory of liability shall be imposed upon dentists as well as physicians).
'4 See Laskowitz v. Ciba Vision Corp., 632 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (App. Div. 1995)
(holding that although legislature codified actions involving medical, podiatric, or
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evolved to answer the question of "who is a medical practitioner?"
This issue first arose in the New York Supreme Court case
Prooth v. Wallsh."5 In Prooth, the plaintiff agreed to cardiac surgery after having been referred to a cardiologist and a cardiac
surgeon by his treating physician, who was an internist. 6 The
court was confronted with the question of which physicians in
the medical hierarchy are required to obtain the patient's consent."' The court acknowledged that typically the plaintiffs primary physician, in this case his internist, bears the role of gatekeeper for his medical care.8" Further, the court recognized that
the physician cannot himself assume liability for all phases of
the patient's treatment, such as the surgery performed by the
cardiac specialist 9 The court therefore acknowledged a limit to
liability because the proper duty of a physician is often simply to
prescribe "a course of treatment by others, such as specialists."90
The question then becomes how the medical referral should
be treated and what legal recognition should be granted to this
medical axis. The Prooth court correlated informed consent to
treatment. 9' Therefore, to the extent that treatment is offered,
the treating physician must look to his patient for an informed
consent.9 2 The court further stated:
To the degree that the physician provides such treatment directly, he obviously bears a duty to advise his patients of the
risk. Further, if he refers his patient to another physician and
retains a degree of participation, by way of control, consultation
or otherwise, his responsibility continues to properly advise his
dental malpractice based on failure to obtain informed consent, it has not rescinded
common law doctrine of informed consent).
"432 N.Y.S.2d 663 (Sup. Ct. 1980); see also supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
Prooth,432 N.Y.S.2d at 664.
"' Id. The plaintiff-patient named as defendants the hospital, his personal
treating physician (the internist), the chief surgeon (a private cardiac surgeon) and
the assisting surgeon. Id.
Id. at 665 ("A patient's personal physician bears the responsibility to assure
the welfare of his patient in all phases of his treatment.").
8 Id.
90Id. The court recognized that after the personal physician refers the patient
to another doctor, "the second physician also has a duty to inform the patient." Id.
9' The Prooth court noted that the doctor's duty is to "explain the particular
risks of his phase of the treatment, for example, surgery or anesthesia, [and thus] it
does not automatically follow that he has an obligation to inform the patient of the
risks of another participant's treatment." Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
92 Id.
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patients with respect to the treatment to be performed by the
referred physician.9 3
Hence, the actual treatment engenders the medical provider's dual obligation to disclose the risks and benefits to the
patient as well as the duty to obtain the patient's informed consent. Therefore, the specialist to whom the patient has been re94
ferred must assume liability for his phase of the treatment. Although treatment defines the medical provider's legal obligation,
a collaborative effort between referring and treating physicians
is still recognized. The referring physician will continue to have
legal responsibilities if he "retains a degree of participation, by
way of control, consultation or otherwise." 95 The Prooth court
chose not to define "control" since its decision that the referring
physician is not legally liable for a failure to disclose and to ob96
tain informed consent was sufficient for its ruling.
In 1984, the Prooth case and its oblique reference to the referring physician's "participation or control" was revisited. In
97
after suffering from ulNisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hospital,
cerative colitis for ten years, plaintiff-patient agreed to surgery
to remove his colon and rectum.9 8 Following surgery, the patient
became organically impotent as a result of either the surgery or
postoperative scarring. 99 The plaintiff-patient claimed that neither his personal physician nor the surgeon discussed the risk of
impotence with him.'0° Plaintiff grounded his cause of action on
a failure to obtain informed consent claim and sued both the internist, who was the referring physician, and the surgeon who
A question arose as to whether the
performed the procedure.'
internist who referred the patient to the specialist could be held

"Prooth, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
4 Id.
95Id.
9'Id. at 666. The court concluded that the treating physician and the chief surgeon are the only parties charged with the duty of obtaining informed consent. Id.
97 483 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
"sId. at 569.
' Id.
100 Id. at 570. One of the defendants, Dr. Glenart, head of the surgical team,
advised the plaintiff that impotence was an unlikely but possible risk of the surgery.
Id. at 569. The plaintiffs expert witness testified that although Dr. Glenart's advice
constituted adequate warning of the risk of impotence, the doctor deviated from appropriate standards in obtaining informed consent to the particular operation by not
discussing all possible causes of impotence. Id. at 569-70.
101Id. at 569.
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liable. The internist neither performed nor recommended the
surgery; instead, once the internist determined that the course of
non-surgical treatment which he had pursued was no longer an
effective course of treatment, he referred the plaintiff to the surgeon.0 2 The Nisenholtz court examined the Prooth decision and
found that the simple act of referring a patient to another physician does not create liability for the referring physician and
does not impose a duty to obtain informed consent to treatment
rendered by the second physician.0 3
The Nisenholtz court disagreed with the Prooth decision and
stated that in order to impose liability, a referring physician
must do more than simply retain a "degree of participation. "1 "
The court found that the internist's action of simply visiting his
patient in the hospital during the individual's stay for surgery
did not amount to participation.' 5 It is unclear from the court's
opinion whether the internist billed for these hospital visits. The
court did not discuss whether the billing for the internist's visits
would have entailed different legal consequences. However, the
court did recognize a factor that would engender liability: "[tihe
referring physician should be held liable only when that physician has ordered a procedure or actually participates in the
treatment or procedure."0 6
102

Id.

at 572-73. The internist did, however, advise the plaintiff to seriously

consider the surgery. Id. at 573.
'03 Id. at 573 ("[Tlhe mere act of referring a patient to another physician is insufficient to create liability on the part of the referring physician to obtain informed
consent to treatment rendered by the second physician .... "). Other jurisdictions also
have not conferred liability to referring physicians or assistants who neither ordered
nor performed the procedure. See, e.g., Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439
N.E.2d 240, 245 (Mass. 1982) (stating that no case law exists that would impose
duty of informed consent on surgical assistant); Prooth v. Wallsh, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663,
666 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (indicating that treating physician and chief surgeon had duty to
obtain consent); Rittes v. Delany, 790 S.W.2d 29, 30-32 (Tx. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that only operating physician had duty to obtain informed consent).
104Nisenholtz, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 573 ("For liability to arise, the referring physician must do more than retain 'a degree of participation,' as described in Prooth.");
see also infra note 106 and accompanying text.
105Id.
'06Id. In Graddy v. New York Medical College, 243 N.Y.S.2d 940 (App. Div.
1963), the court stated that liability imposed on one physician for the actions of another is "limited to situations of joint action in diagnosis or treatment or some control of the course of treatment of one by the other." Id. at 943. The Prooth court interpreted this to apply to a referring physician who "retains a degree of
participation, by way of control, consultation or otherwise .... Prooth, 432 N.Y.S.2d
at 665. The Nisenholtz court disagreed with such an expansive interpretation. Nis-
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The Nisenholtz holding was later refined by the Appellate
Division in Spinosa v. Weinstein."7 The defendant, Dr. Weinstein, was a podiatrist who performed a series of thirty-four
surgical procedures to remove bunions and to correct the misalignment of the plaintiffs toes."'8 The plaintiff asserted that as
a consequence of this surgery, her toes became hammered and
her feet caused her constant pain."' Also named as defendant
was Dr. Hochran, who was the surgical assistant during these
procedures, during which he administered local anesthetics and
handed instruments to Dr. Weinstein-the treating podiatrist.'
Dr. Hochran performed no actual surgery on plaintiffs feet; instead, his interaction with the plaintiff was limited to post surgical follow-up care."
One of the central issues in Spinosa was whether liability
should be imposed on Dr. Hochran for a failure to obtain informed consent. Under the Nisenholtz standard, responsibility is
not to be imposed on a medical provider who neither performed
nor ordered the procedure."' In Spinosa, the plaintiff argued
that the Nisenholtz facts should be distinguished based on the
degree of Dr. Hochran's participation in the plaintiffs care.1
Accordingly, the plaintiff sought to hold the surgical assistant,
Dr. Hochran, liable for failure to obtain informed consent on the
basis that he could be considered a "person providing the professional treatment""' within the meaning of section 2805-d(1).
While the court recognized that Dr. Hochran's participation
in the patient's care exceeded that of the referring physician in
Nisenholtz and that he could therefore be considered a "person
providing the professional treatment,"" 5 the court refused to exenholtz, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
107 571 N.Y.S.2d 747 (App. Div. 1991).
103Id. at 749.
1c Id

110Id. at 749-50.

"' Id. at 750. Part of Dr. Hochran's follow-up care included removing sutures
and changing bandages. Id.
112 Nisenholtz, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 573; see supra notes 97-106
and accompanying
text.
113 Spinosa, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
114 Id.
"s Id. ("[Wie recognize that Dr. Hochran can be considered a 'person providing
the professional treatment' within the meaning of Public Health Law § 2805-d(1)
.... "). The Spinosa court also distinguished the degree of participation by the assisting physician in the instant case from that of the assistant in Prooth. Id. In Prooth,
since the assisting surgeon was "called in to [sic] the operation by the chief surgeon
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tend liability in such a case because it would require the physician to inform the patient of the risks involved in the treatment
rendered by others."18 Interpreting section 2805-d(1) broadly so
as to impose liability in such cases would ultimately backfire and
harm the patient because, by being constantly advised of the
same risks, the patient
would be discouraged from agreeing to
7
treatment."
necessary
In Hill v. Seward,"8 the New York Supreme Court further
analyzed the issue of which actors in the medical hierarchy
should be held liable for not procuring an informed consent. The
Hill court held that although a medical resident is an important
member in a teaching hospital, a resident cannot be held accountable for failing to obtain the patent's informed consent even
if he in fact discussed the surgery with the patient."9 Performance or participation in the treatment or procedure triggers the
legal requirement to obtain a patient's informed consent. The
court reasoned that in spite of the numerous occasions in which
the resident interacted with the patient, the resident cannot be
held liable because he did not perform or participate in the surgery in any manner. 12 Thus, even in cases where the information is provided by a person with the qualifications to inform, liability nevertheless
may only be imposed on the treating
121
physician.
22
In a later case, the Appellate Division, in Brandon v. Karp,'
and [was] answerable [only] to him," the assisting physician was not liable for the
results of the procedure performed by the chief surgeon. 432 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665-66
(Sup. Ct. 1980).
16 Spinosa, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 752.

117

Id. But see Richard E. Simpson, Informed Consent: From Disclosure to Pa-

tient Participationin Medical Decisionmaking, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 172, 195 (1981)
(asserting that greater number of disclosure sessions increase patient's ability to
understand relevant information).
118 470 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
Id. at 972 (finding that doctor who discusses surgery with patient is not liable for lack of informed consent unless he actually performs or participates in sur120 Id.
at 972 ("The law ... does not impose on the doctor who discusses the surgery with the patient any liability for surgery performed without informed consent
unless that doctor performs or participates in the performance of the surgery."); see
also Prooth, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 665 (stating that duty to obtain informed consent rests
with physician who is treating patient).
121 Hill, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 972 (stating that failure of resident doctor to disclose
risks of procedure may impose liability on treating physician, but not on resident
physician).
122 490 N.Y.S.2d 904 (App. Div. 1985).
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reaffirmed the requirement that the treating physician secure an
informed consent from his patient." In Brandon, a nurse misinformed the patient of a treatment procedure while acquiring the
plaintiffs signature on a consent form. 24 The misinformation,
however, was corrected by the treating physician immediately
prior to the initiation of treatment." Although an erroneous
impression may have been created in the plaintiffs mind, the
court held that since this impression was corrected within a
timely manner, such misinformation cannot establish the basis
of a lawsuit based on the failure to obtain informed consent."'
The court's rationale in cases such as Brandon is questionable
where, at the time of the actual procedure, the patient is less focused and arguably unable to give an informed consent.'
In es'12Id. at 906. The court emphasized that Public Health Law § 2805-d(1) places
responsibility to disclose only on the professional who provides treatment or diagnosis. Id.
124 Id. at 905.
12r Id
110 Id.

at 906 ("Since [the treating physician] corrected the misinformation be-

fore performing the procedure, and plaintiff did not object after learning of the actual nature of the procedure, the nurse's error could not have been a proximate
cause of any alleged injury .... ").
17 Although the nurse and the physician in Brandon
discussed the procedure
with the plaintiff on the same day, the length of time that passed between each consultation is not part of the record. Id. at 905. There is at least some risk that a patient may not provide informed consent when presented with information immediately prior to the procedure. See Simpson, supra note 117, at 195 (noting that
patient is more likely to fully comprehend information given prior to granting consent if he has sufficient time to weigh all factors). Although New York's Public
Health Law requires disclosure of information "in a manner permitting the patient
to make a knowledgeable evaluation," N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1)
(McKinney 1993), the law does not mandate any procedure to ensure the patient's
understanding of the information. While this may be implicitly stated in the statute,
the court in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), stated that "the
focus of attention is more properly upon the nature and content of the physician's
divulgence than the patient's understanding or consent." Id. at 780 n.15. New York
adopted the Canterbury rationale in Fogal v. Genessee Hospital, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552
(App. Div. 1973), focusing on the standard to apply when determining whether disclosure is adequate. Id. at 559. The Fogal court held that a doctor is obliged to divulge all risks that a patient should reasonably know and that may affect the patient's decision regarding treatment. Id. The court, however, did not require a
demonstration of the patient's understanding in order to show adequate disclosure.
Id.; see generally Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 379,
406-27 (1990) (discussing various reasons why patients typically do not fully understand information given to them by physicians, and recommending ways to avoid
this lack of comprehension). For other articles suggesting improvements to the informed consent process, see Miller & Willner, The Two-Part Consent Form:A Sug-
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sence, the court sent a message to patients that they must examine the source of their information. Since a nurse has no
authority to obtain consent, the information necessary to form
consent can only be conveyed by the treating physician.'28 Hence,
after consideration of the cases discussed in this section, it appears that the legal theme is that only those medical providers
who prescribe treatment or perform the medical procedure are
obligated to obtain the patient's informed consent.
A recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals in this
area is Rosenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States,29 which commented on the legal requirements for
obtaining informed consent when an insurance company is the
referring party. In Rosenberg, the plaintiff brought a wrongful
death action upon the death of her husband, who died of cardiac
failure resulting from the administration of a stress electrocardiogram (EKG) ordered by the insurance company as a precondition to obtaining life insurance.13 The decedent had a history
of heart disease and had suffered a heart attack eight years prior
to his death.13' The insurer's form required that a Dr. Arora per13 2
form an EKG to complete decedent's insurance application.
The insurance company thereby referred the decedent to Dr.
Arora, a physician of its choice, for evaluation. 3 3 Plaintiffs expert testified at trial that the EKG was potentially dangerous
under the circumstances. Upon these facts, the jury found that
the EKG was the proximate cause of decedent's death.'
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals considered two main issues:
first, whether the insurance company was vicariously liable for
the negligence of Dr. Arora; and second, whether the company
was liable for its own negligence in ordering the EKG and failing
135
to obtain decedent's informed consent to the examination.
The Court of Appeals found that the physician in this case
gestion for PromotingFree and Informed Consent, 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 964 (1974);
and Simpson, supra note 117, at 192-95.
128 Brandon, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 906; see also Cirella v. Central Gen. Hosp., 630
N.Y.S.2d 93, 94 (App. Div. 1985) (refusing to hold hospital liable, notwithstanding
fact that hospital employee undertook ministerial task of recording consent).
129 595 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 1992).
130

Id. at 842.

131
132

Id.
Id.

13 Id.

...
Id. at 842-43.
135 Id.
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was an independent contractor, and as such the insurance company was not vicariously liable for his negligence.136 More importantly, in addressing the second issue, the court noted that the
doctor was bound by the Hippocratic Oath to do no harm and by
a legal duty under section 2805-d to perform dangerous proceAccording to
dures only with the patient's informed consent.'
the court, the doctor should never be required to subordinate this
professional judgment upon request by another party, even if the
request is made by the insurance company that pays the doctor's
fees. 3' While the insurer may tug at the purse strings, it should
not be able to control how the physician practices his profession.
Once the physician uses his/her professional judgment to administer a given medical procedure, the duty to explain the risks of
that examination to the patient and to obtain the patient's consent belongs to the physician alone.'39 In Rosenberg, the insurance company could not have reasonably anticipated that the
physician would disregard these responsibilities and administer
the EKG when doing so would be dangerous to the patient. 40
Moreover, according to the court, the company could have reasonably expected that the possible risks of a stress EKG would
be disclosed to the decedent.' Since the insurance company had
neither a duty to explain the risks of the medical exam to the
patient nor a duty to obtain his informed consent before referring
found that the insurance company
him to a physician, the 4court
2
could not be held liable.

B. What Must Be Disclosed?
(i) Scope of Disclosure
After the passage of section 2805-d, courts adhered to a twofold test to determine the scope of information that must be dis136Id.
137 Id.

at 844.
"" Id. at 845 ("[No medical doctor can be required to render services which, in
the doctor's professional judgment, are dangerous or contraindicated and public
policy is not served by imposing liability for the doctor's fault in doing so on the insurer.").
' ' Id. at 844-45 (finding doctor, not insurer, had duty to disclose risks of procedure).
"o Id. at 844.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 845.
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closed to the patient. First, measured from the medical provider's point of view, the statute requires the physician to disclose reasonably foreseeable risks that a "reasonable ... practi-

tioner under similar circumstances" would have disclosed to the
patient.1 3 Consequently, to pursue a cause of action, the plaintiff-patient must establish that the medical provider's discussion
with the patient does not comport with what a practitioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed.14 Second, the
information disclosed must, from the vantage point of the patient, be sufficient to allow a "reasonably prudent person in the
4
plaintiffs position" to make a knowledgeable evaluation."
Section 2805-d essentially codified the common law, which implies
the reasonably prudent patient and reasonable practitioner tests
in an action for medical malpractice based on lack of informed
consent. 146
In determining whether the scope of information disclosed
by the medical provider is legally sufficient, the reviewing court
must first determine what a reasonable practitioner in similar
circumstances would have disclosed. Under the statute, the
physician has the duty to disclose alternatives to the treatment
or diagnosis and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1).
'" See, e.g., Shkolnik v. Hospital for Joint Diseases Orthopedic Inst., 627
N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (App. Div. 1995) (noting that plaintiff has burden of establishing
physician's failure to disclose that which reasonably prudent doctor would have disclosed); Bernard v. Block, 575 N.Y.S.2d 506, 511 (App. Div. 1991) (noting that
plaintiff-patient bears burden of proof).
145N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(3).
146 See Lipsius v. White, 458 N.Y.S.2d 928, 934 n.4 (App. Div. 1983) (stating that
section 2805-d codifies New York majority rule regarding informed consent); Dries
v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561, 565 n.2 (App. Div. 1980) (noting that section 2805-d
codifies court's analysis that plaintiff must prove that reasonably prudent person in
plaintiffs position would not have consented to procedure); Pagan v. State, 476
N.Y.S.2d 468, 468-69 (Ct. Cl. 1984) (stating that statute codifies unique elements of
informed consent which must be proven at trial). But see Jeffrey A. Schreiber, A
Case Study of Informed Consent Doctrine in New York, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 431, 433-34
(1981) (characterizing assertion in Dries decision that section 2805-d codifies common law as "misstatement" because section 2805-d imposes "stringent cause-in-fact"
element); cf Laskowitz v. Ciba Vision Corp., 632 N.Y.S.2d 845, 849 (App. Div. 1995)
(holding that whereas section 2805-d includes only doctors, dentists and podiatrists,
"optometrists and other health care professionals" are still bound by common law
duty to obtain patient's informed consent); Bellier v. Bazan, 478 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563
(Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding that although section 2805-d(4) does not include plaintiffs
culpable conduct as defense in informed consent actions, common law mitigation of
damages for such conduct still applies).
'4
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that a reasonable physician would disclose under similar circumstances in order to permit the patient to make an informed
choice as to his medical treatment. "7
Courts must determine, on a case by case basis, what information is significant and material in the particular case and
what level of disclosure is necessary to satisfy the first prong of
the test. For instance, in Ogden v. Bhatti,"8 the court determined that all risks need not be disclosed. In Ogden, the plaintiff had a colonoscopy and a polypectomy performed to remove a
polyp in the sigmoid colon. 9 During the procedure, a perforation
was discovered at the polypectomy site, requiring immediate
surgery.150 Following the surgery, plaintiff instituted an action
based on malpractice and a failure to obtain informed consent. '
The plaintiff alleged that the specific risk of perforation was not
mentioned to her, and therefore her consent to the polypectomy
was not informed.'
The defendant-physician countered by
stating that only general risks had to be mentioned under the
circumstances, implying that the physician need not disclose the
particular risks of perforation unless asked specifically by the
patient."3 In affirming the trial court, the appellate court determined that, based upon the record, a rational juror could reasonably conclude that the pertinent disclosure conformed with
what a reasonable physician under similar circumstances would
have divulged."M Hence, this obviated the need to disclose all
risks to the patient. As a result, some initiative is left to the patient so that he/she may question the physician as to specific
risks, research the medical issues and seek their resolution.
After the reviewing court determines that the plaintiffpatient has proven the first prong of the test, it must then examine whether the second prong-the reasonably prudent patient
test-has been satisfied. In 1980, the Appellate Division in Dries

117 See

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(1); see also Abrams v. Children's Hosp.,
542 N.Y.S.2d 418, 418 (App. Div. 1989) (defining informed consent as providing professional treatment to disclose to patient reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits).
4 460 N.Y.S.2d 166 (App. Div. 1983).
1 Id. at 167.
150
Id.
151Id.
152 Id.
'r
1'4

Id. at 168.
Id. at 167.
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v. Gregor5 followed the reasonably prudent person in the patient's position analysis established at common law in a cause of
action based on negligence for failure to obtain the patient's informed consent. 5 6 The Appellate Division adopted the objective
test and found that the hypothetical reasonably prudent person
would not have consented to the procedure performed in the instant case. 11 7 In Dries, the plaintiff was referred by her gynecologist to defendant-surgeon Dr. Gregor after a radiologist's report revealed a lesion in her right breast.'58 Prior to any surgery,
Dr. Gregor advised the plaintiff to undergo a biopsy procedure,
which he described to plaintiff as a procedure that was to be performed under anesthesia and in which only a small sample of
breast tissue would be removed for analysis.'59 Instead, the doctor performed a "quadrant resection," which removed approximately three segments totaling two and one-half to two and
three-quarter inches of the patient's right breast.6 ' After the
procedure, the plaintiff discovered that the "top of [her right]
breast was gone." 6 ' Eventually, it was determined that the tissue was not cancerous.'6 2 The court found that the discrepancy
between what the patient was told and what actually transpired
was substantial enough to warrant the conclusion that a reasonably prudent person would
not have consented to the proce63
dure actually performed.
One cannot help but wonder whether the plaintiff would
have been as successful in the Dries case had the biopsy procedure identified a cancerous condition. If the court allowed the
,s 424 N.Y.S.2d 561 (App. Div. 1980).
156 Id. at 563-65. Apparently, the Dries court did not base its analysis on section
2805-d because the surgery was conducted in 1974, prior to the Act's passage. See
id. at 565 n.2.
,57 Id. at 565.

'4 Id. at 563.
"'9 Id. (noting that plaintiff testified that Dr. Gregor told her "a snip" was to be
removed from her breast).
160 Id. at 562-63. The plaintiff testified that she was never advised that Dr. Gregor would perform a quadratic resection or "partial mastectomy." Id. at 563. Dr.
Gregor did not dispute plaintiffs description of the scope of his disclosure. Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.

6' Id. at 565. The trial court charged the jury that, in order to find that there
had been a lack of informed consent, they would have to determine first whether a
reasonably prudent person would have consented to the surgery performed on the
patient. Id. The jury found a lack of informed consent, and the Appellate Division
did not dispute this finding. Id.
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outcome of the procedure to influence its decision, it has transgressed the basic purpose of the objective test-that is, the
avoidance of the bias caused by hindsight and its twenty/twenty
perception."M For this reason, the outcome of the treatment or
procedure should not be a factor in applying the objective test.
An issue remains as to how courts are to translate the double-pronged test into language that the jury, which is comprised
of laypersons, can understand. In Troy v. Long Island Jewish
Hillside Medical Center, 61 the Appellate Division ruled on this
issue but failed to set forth a clear rule or test to guide other
courts. In Troy, the trial judge interpreted the "reasonable
medical practitioner under similar circumstances" test to require
a "doctor ... [to] give the patient all the options he has available
to him and then allow the patient to make his choice." 166 The

Appellate Division found that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury.1 7 By characterizing the trial judge's
charge as error, the court implied that a trial judge must state
the test specifically in terms of the "reasonable medical practitioner under similar circumstances" formulation so that the jury
understands that the acts of the medical provider are being compared to and measured by those of the reasonably prudent practitioner.6 ' Trial judges are in a predicament: first, they must en'" See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[The subjective] method ... comes in second-best. It places the physician in jeopardy of the
patient's hindsight and bitterness."); Barnette v. Potenza, 359 N.Y.S.2d 432, 437
(Sup. Ct. 1974) (stating that justice would not be served by irrational process ofjury
reliance on patient's hindsight); see also Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical
Malpracticev. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in HindsightBias, 73 OR. L.
REV. 587, 590 (1994) (stating that "there is no reason why hindsight bias ought to be
tolerated in cases of medical malpractice"); Mary Ann Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: ProtectingPatientsFrom Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 347 n.202
(1994) (noting risks of subjective standard because "patients might always claim
that they would have rejected the proposed treatment had they known of the undisclosed risk") (emphasis added); cf Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 918-19 (1994) (positing that potential bias of plaintiffs subjective testimony regarding whether she would have consented may be reason most
states, although permitting such testimony, opt for objective standard). But cf Dieter Giesen, Vindicating the Patient's Rights: A Comparative Perspective, 9 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 273, 299 (labeling objective test as insufficient means
of indicating patient's need to determine what is to be done to her body and finding
subjective test more suitable).
' 446 N.Y.S.2d 347 (App. Div. 1982).
Id. at 349.
,87 Id. at 349-50.
"" Id. at 349 (holding that trial judge's misstatement of legal standard may have
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sure that juries understand the legal standards upon which they
will decide the case; and second, they must not alter the test to
the point where it becomes a misstatement of the standard. 6 9
As a consequence of this objective test, some courts, in their
application of the test, have denigrated the need for the patient's
informed consent in certain situations where "the jury could reasonably [find] that an informed, reasonably prudent person
would nevertheless have consented to the treatment."170 This
rationale seems to undermine the very essence of the principle of
patient self-determination. 7 ' If the goal of the principle of
autonomy is to grant the patient the right to guide his treatment, including the right to refuse treatment already initiated, 72
then the court's granting to the jury the ability to fall back on
the concept of the "reasonably prudent person," who may consent
to treatment despite the lack of appropriate information for the
particular patient-plaintiff, effectively destroys the notion of
choice.
In Kuncio v. Millard Fillmore Hospital,7 ' the failure to obtain informed consent arose at a point in time when the state of
174
medicine was not of the same caliber as at the date of trial.
caused jury to misunderstand appropriate standard).
'69
See Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561, 565 (App. Div. 1980) (reversing trial
court because question posed during jury charge confused jury concerning element
of causation which had previously established liability based on lack of informed
consent). For other informed consent cases involving discussion of erroneous jury
charges, see Radloff v. Adler, 613 N.Y.S.2d 779, 780 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that
judge's error of giving jury obsolete instruction on informed consent charge was
harmless); Kasenetz v. Vieta, 568 N.Y.S.2d 383, 383 (App. Div. 1991) (holding trial
court did not err in charge regarding section 2805-d defenses); and Ogden v. Bhatti,
460 N.Y.S.2d 166, 168 (App. Div. 1983) (upholding trial court's charge).
170Kuncio v. Millard Fillmore Hosp., 499 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (App. Div. 1986); see
Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412 (1978) (refusing to legally recognize claim of
negligence "dependent upon a comparison between Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence" based on defendant's failure to inform patients of
their choices); Joswick v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 570 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1986)
(stating that it was unreasonable to conclude that parents of infant would have refused life saving procedures even if they had been informed of possible risk of brain
damage).
:72 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
72 See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying
text.
'73 499 N.Y.S.2d 525 (App. Div. 1986).
174Id. at 526 (stating that issue was "whether the administration of supplemental oxygen was a deviation from accepted standards of practice in March 1953" because there was no dispute that "since 1954 medical science ...
[had] uniformly recognized exposure to increased oxygen levels as the leading cause of RLF [retrolental
fibroplasia").
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Such differences related both to the protocols of treatment as
well as to the practical aspects of medical office practice. In the
Kuncio case, the treatment procedure for premature babies at
birth was significantly different from its practice at trial. 175 In
fact, the defendant-physicians conceded that they did not obtain
the patient's consent, but they argued that such consent was not
necessary given the state of medicine at the time. 76 In their argument, the defendants alluded to the community standard of
practice without using the statutory "reasonably prudent practitioner in similar circumstances" standard. 177 The Appellate Division agreed with this argument and imported into its opinion a
meaning that even the defendants could not have intended. The
defendants simply argued that they could not be held accountable for a standard of medical practice to which they conformed
as it was the duty of the parents to obtain the consent.7 7 The
court furthered this argument by concluding that "the jury could
reasonably have found that ... [a] reasonably prudent person
would nevertheless have consented to the treatment." 79 Consequently, the failure to inform the patient, in this instance, is irrelevant.
The Kuncio case can be restricted to its particular facts. In
Kuncio, there existed a question of emerging trends in both the
areas of medical treatment as well as medical administrative
procedure. Is the medical provider to be sanctioned for failure to
obtain consent when a particular treatment had not yet fully
emerged as the definitive community practice? At least in Kuncio, the court refused to append legal liability in the case where
the medical provider failed to inform the patient of the risks concerning a particular treatment that had not yet fully emerged as
the definitive community practice.
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals, in Becker v.
0
restricted the ability of a plaintiff to make an arguSchwartz,'"
based on defendant's failure to obtain inof
negligence
ment
8
formed consent.1 ' There, plaintiff, who was thirty-seven years of
'75Id. at 526-27.
176 Id. at 527.
177
178

Id.
Id.

at 527 ("[D]efendant argued ... that informed consent was unnecessary at

that time given the state of the art.").
179 Id.

'0 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
181 Id.

at 898.
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age, conceived a child born brain damaged and suffering from
Down's Syndrome.'82 Plaintiff argued that the defendantphysician's failure to warn her of the increased risk of Down's
Syndrome in children born to women over thirty-five years of age
and to inform her of the availability of the amniocentesis test to
detect chromosomal abnormality associated with Down's Syndrome constituted medical malpractice.'
In essence, plaintiff
was not informed of her choices."8 The results of an amniocentesis test would likely have precipitated plaintiffs decision to
terminate the pregnancy. 185 As a result, plaintiff sought damages on behalf of the infant for wrongful life.' 86 The Court of Appeals refused to extend the principle of autonomy to the extent
pushed by the plaintiff.8 7 The court characterized the plaintiffs
claim as a "demand[] [for] a calculation of damages dependent
upon a comparison between Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence ... [a] comparison the law is not

equipped to make." 8 8 As a necessary corollary, the defendant's
failure to inform the patient was without effect where the court
determined that the infant did not suffer any legally cognizable
injury.'81 9
Similarly, in Joswick v. Lenox Hill Hospital,9 ° the parents of

a young child were confronted with the proverbial choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. A child was born with a
congenital abnormality involving transposition of the aorta with
the pulmonary artery, causing blood to circulate without first
being oxygenated.' 91 A dangerous operation known as a
"mustard procedure" was necessary to correct this abnormality.
The parents were informed that the surgery was vital for the
child's survival, and that even then, the baby had only a ten percent chance of living.'92 The child's mother testified that she
182 Id. at 896.
18 Id. at 897.

Id. at 899 (noting that plaintiffs argued that "had [they] been properly advised by defendants of the risks of abnormality, their infant would never have been
born").
'8 Id. at 898.
188 Id. at 897.
187 Id. at 901.
1"8Id. at 900.
18 Id. at 901.
19 510 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
1

181 Id. at 804.
182 Id. at 805.
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"was willing to submit her daughter to surgery for 'whatever
possible chance the surgery would offer' her child."'93 Although
the operation was successful, the child became severely retarded
following the procedure.'
The defendant-physicians were sued
on grounds that they had not informed the parents of the risk of
possible brain damage.'
The parents argued that they would
not have consented to the mustard procedure if warned of the
risk of brain damage, even though failure to operate would have
resulted in certain death.'9 8
The Joswick court began its analysis with the assumption
that a parent may not deprive a child of life-saving treatment
where the deprivation will result in death.' 97 The court found
that, in light of the second part of the test under the statutespecifically that plaintiff must show that a reasonable person in
a similar position would not have consented to the procedure-it
was unreasonable to conclude that parents in plaintiffs' position
would have refused the procedure even if they had been informed
of possible brain damage."" It appears the court was positing
that there is no autonomous self-determination granted to the
patient where they must choose between mental retardation and
certain death. Hence, it is submitted that an analysis of the
cases discussed in this subsection lead to the conclusion that certain issues are simply not on the table for discussion, no matter
how material they may be to the plaintiff's evaluation.
(ii) Disclosure and Training Qualifications
The Appellate Division, in Abram v. Children's Hospital of
Buffalo,9 " has declared that the medical provider also need not
inform patients of the qualifications of personnel providing
treatment."' The plaintiff-patient in Abram moved to amend his
medical malpractice complaint to add a cause of action based on
lack of informed consent claiming that he was never fully informed of the level of participation of certain under-qualified at193

Id.

194id.

"' Id. at 805.
lea Id.
197 Id.
("Moreover, a parent may not deprive a child of life-saving treatment,
where the only alternative is certain death.").
19

Id.

542 N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1989).
200Id. at 419.
"
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tendants. °' The Abram court found that the statute restricted
the disclosure requirement to discussion of diagnosis, alternatives and reasonably foreseeable risks to treatment.02 The court
stated that the legislation was specifically restricted to those ardiseas and as such could not be "reasonably read ... to require
2 3

closure of qualifications of personnel providing treatment."

(iii) Disclosure and Administrative Agencies
A novel question regarding the scope of risk assessment was
presented in Retkwa v. Orentreich.2 0' There, plaintiff brought a
cause of action alleging lack of informed consent based on physician's failure to reveal information regarding the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) status of liquid injectable silicone. 20 ' Es-

sentially, the physician did not reveal that the silicone had not
yet been approved by the FDA. Plaintiff argued that this information constituted a risk within the meaning of the statute.0 0
The question arose as to whether such information concerning
the action of a government agency is the type of information of
which a patient must be made aware so as to facilitate his
evaluation and decision-making process. The Retkwa court held
that the information was of such a nature that a reasonable patient would want its divulgence and thereby denied the physician's motion to exclude evidence and testimony that injectable
silicone was still unapproved by the FDA.0 7
The court traced the history of New York's informed consent
doctrine from the objective physician-based standard to the patient-based materiality standard enunciated in Canterbury v.
Spence.. back to the objective professional standard with the en20 Id. at 418.
202

20

Id.
Id. at 419.

24 584 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
205 Id.

200 Id.

at 710.
Defendant made a motion, in limine, to exclude evidence and testimony

that liquid injectable silicone was not approved by the FDA. Id.
207 Id. at 712 ("There can be little question that in assessing the risk of a drug or
injectable substance, a reasonable patient would want information as to whether
that drug or substance has been tested and/or approved by Federal authorities.").
218In Canterbury v. Spence, the court held that the duty to disclose and the
scope of disclosure are determined by a general standard of conduct reasonable under all circumstances. 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1972). According to the Canterbury court, the test for determining when a risk must be disclosed is whether such
risk will materially affect the patient's decision to proceed with the procedure. Id. at
787. The Canterbury court noted that the duty to disclose should not be measured
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actment of the 1975 statute."9 The court then examined case law
from Arizona that applied the objective professional standard.210
In Arizona, when a physician uses an investigational drug or
procedure, he must inform his patient of its "novelty or its investigational status."2 1 ' In both Arizona and New York, plaintiff
must offer a physician's testimony to establish the professional
standard or what a reasonable doctor would have disclosed in
the situation." 2
(iv) Disclosure and Frequency of Risk Occurrence
The Appellate Division's decision in Marchione v. State"3
represents the most recent significant case involving an allegation of a physician's failure to properly inform the patient. In
Marchione, the plaintiff, a prison inmate, brought an action alleging lack of informed consent based on the failure of the prison
doctor to inform him about the side effects of a hypertension
drug, Minipress.1 4 After taking the medication, the inmate suffered from permanent impotence. 215 The defendant-physician argued that at the date of the drug's administration, priapism,
which led to the plaintiffs permanent impotence, was not a recognized side effect of Minipress. 2 6 The doctor further argued
that, according to the medical literature, no causal link had been
established between Minipress and priapism, and that the two or
three cases reporting such causation in a population of several
million did not create a significant risk of which the plaintiff had
to be informed.2 17 The doctor argued that his duty was only to inform patients of severe or frequent side effects.2 18
The Marchione case raises the question of when a significant
risk exists and whether the determination of a physician's duty
to inform is tied to the likelihood of that risk's occurrence. The
by the profession's standards of due care. Id. at 785.
2"3 Retkwa, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 711. The Retkwa court noted that the New York
Legislature returned New York to the professional standard test in response to the
threat of a physicians' strike in 1975. Id.
210

Id. at 712.

211

Id.

212

Id. at 713.

213

598 N.Y.S.2d 592 (App. Div. 1993).

214 Id. at

593.

215

Id.

216

Id. at 594.

217

Id.

218

Id. at 594.
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Appellate Division upheld the trial court's determination that
the physician's conduct was not unlawful and found that the risk
was "so rare that it is entirely reasonable to not find a physician
liable for failing to inform a patient of such a possibility.""9 The
court accepted the argument that Minipress was limited in its
potential danger to only two or three cases out of several million
and therefore had too rare an incidence to require disclosure.220
This decision, in effect, authorized the prison doctor's practice of
telling patients only about the frequent side effects of the drug,
despite the fact that the Physicians' Desk Reference (PDR), a
manual that categorizes drugs currently available on the market, listed priapism as one of thirty-one reactions associated with
Minipress.2 2 ' The Marchione court concluded that a physician
need not disclose a laundry list of reactions and side
22 effects to
2805-d(1).
section
with
comply
to
order
in
patient
the
In comparing the Marchione decision with the previously
discussed Nisenholtz case,223 a discrepancy in New York law regarding a physician's duty to disclose the low-percentage risks in
a given procedure emerges.22 4 In Nisenholtz, the risk of impotence resulting from surgery for ulcerative colitis was very remote and had a statistical rate of only one to two percent.225 The
defendants stipulated that a physician is required to indicate the
likelihood of the occurrence of the risks, and in fact the physicians did discuss this slight risk with the plaintiff before surgery. 226 The court acknowledged that the risk, albeit very slight,
was properly disclosed.227 However, the court refused to rule as a
matter of law that a physician's only duty is to list potential adverse reactions and their frequency of occurrence.2
In certain
situations where risks that are slight to the general population
are more significant to the particular patient, the physician is
required to provide more information, such as the mechanics by

220

Id.
Id.

21

Id.

219

222

Id. (holding doctor not liable for failing to list thirty-one remote side effects of

Minipress).
2 Nisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 483 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
224 See supra notes 97-106 and accompanying text for an in-depth analysis of the
Nisenholtz decision.
225 Nisenholtz, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 569-70.
226 Id. at 571.
227 Id.
2 Id. at 572.
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which harm could occur.

579

229

The decisions in Nisenholtz and Marchione are seemingly irreconcilable. In Nisenholtz, the doctor notified the patient of the
existence of infrequently occurring side effects, namely the one
or two percent risk of impotence."0 Still, the court held the defendant-physician did not satisfy his duty because he did not
provide the patient with enough information to make a
"knowledgeable evaluation of whether to submit to that procedure."21 The Marchione court did not even reach the question of
whether the physician properly explained the risks because the
court found that the physician did not have to disclose the slight
risks. The difference in analysis in the two cases cannot be attributed to the different risks involved since the risks did not
really differ statistically. Perhaps the true distinction between
the cases resides in the legal capacities of the plaintiffs. Mr.
Marchione was a prison inmate, whereas Mr. Nisenholtz was an
informed patient who was financially capable of contracting for
the services of a private physician at a private institution. Short
of unveiling such demarcations, fine tuning distinguishing features between the two cases remains difficult. Both Marchione
and Nisenholtz involve infrequently occurring risks, and yet only
the Nisenholtz court required disclosure of such risks, while the
court in Marchione chose not to impose such a duty.
C. Reasonable Person in Patient'sCircumstances
The statute in section 2805-d(1) mandates that information
be disclosed "in a manner permitting the patient to make a
knowledgeable evaluation."2 3 By reason of this language, the severity of the objective community medical standard-the practitioner under similar circumstances test-is mitigated by the
statutory requirement that the physician ensure his disclosure is
of a scope and caliber to allow the patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation. If plaintiff is able to show that a doctor's failure
to disclose was not reasonable, section 2805-d(3) requires that
plaintiff also establish that a '"reasonably prudent person in the
patient's position" would not have consented to the procedure or
'9 Id. at
230 Id.
231

571.

Id.

232 598

N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (App. Div. 1993).

m N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(l).
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treatment had he been fully informedY24
The statute marked a turning point away from case law that
applied the "materiality to patient" standard enunciated in the
landmark case Canterbury v. Spence.235 In Canterbury,the complaint alleged that the doctor failed to obtain consent to a
laminectomy procedure.2s The court found that it was the physician's duty to provide that degree of information needed by the
patient to form an intelligent decision."
The court concluded
that the patient's right of self-determination shaped the parameters of the physician's duty of disclosure and set forth a
"materiality" test for determining the risks that must be disclosed to the patient prior to evaluation and the patient's decision.2 8
This materiality to the patient test articulated by the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Canterbury, was
adopted in 1973 by the New York Appellate Division in Fogal v.
2 9 Mrs. Fogal was injured through the use of a
Genesee Hospital.
hypothermia blanket designed to cool her body temperature
during kidney surgery.24 The use of the blanket to induce hypothermia to slow the body's metabolism was a "recognized surgical practice" because the procedure required stopping the blood
supply to portions of her body for long periods of time.24 ' Because
the electronic control unit designed to maintain the patient's
body at a constant temperature was defective, Mrs. Fogal's feet,
thighs and buttocks became necrotic, requiring removal of parts
of her legs, buttocks, and both of her feet.242
The issue in Fogal was whether the doctor provided the patient with sufficient information regarding the risks associated

234§ 2805-d(3).
235464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
236 Id. at 778.
237 See id. at 786.
2'8

Id.

See id. at 786-87.

The scope of the physician's communication to the patient, then, must be
measured by the patient's need, and that need is the information material
to the decision. Thus the test for determining whether a particular peril
must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked.
239344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (App. Div. 1973).
240 See id. at 556-57.
211 Id. at 557.
2142See

id. at 556.
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with the use of a hypothermia blanket.243 The court specifically
adopted the Canterbury rule, holding that a doctor has a duty to
disclose to his patient those risks that will materially affect the
patient's decision of whether to consent to the treatment.244 Further, the court stated that the issue of whether the use of the
hypothermia blanket was appropriate or necessary was immaterial because the critical issue was whether informed consent was
obtained. 5 Given the likelihood that the patient's determination
would be motivated by hindsight, the Fogal court asked whether
a "reasonably prudent person in [the patient's] ... circumstances,

having sufficient knowledge of the material risks incident to the
procedure" would have undergone the surgery.246 This was the
standard applicable to all lack of informed consent cases in New
York before the enactment of the 1975 statute. 24 7
Under the Act, the patient's circumstances are considered by
the court in determining whether the consent given was valid.
Courts have indicated that an informed consent obtained from a
patient during a time of extreme stress invalidates that consent.248 Child birth has been identified as a time of extreme
stress.4 9 For instance, in Hare v. Parsley,20 a physician's obtaining consent to perform an elective sterilization procedure during
labor was invalidated.2' Hence, the harshness of the objective
standard of the medical community is mitigated by the requirement that a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances
only agree to the procedure based on the information given "in a
manner permitting the patient to make a knowledgeable
evaluation."

24

Id. at 560.

24 Id. at 559.
215 Id. at 560.
248

Id.

217 See id.; see also Barnette v. Potenza, 359 N.Y.S.2d 432, 436 (Sup. Ct. 1974)

(citing test enunciated in Fogal as correct test to be applied in medical malpractice
informed consent cases); cf. Maijorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient
Choice: A New ProtectedInterest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (discussing current status
of informed consent doctrine).
248 See Hare v. Parsley, 596 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding as matter
of law that physician and hospital deviated from accepted standards of medical care
by accepting patient's consent for sterilization during childbirth).
248 See id. at 314 ([lnformed consent may not be obtained while the
patient ...
is in labor or childbirth ....").
258 596 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
251 Id. at 314.
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D. Role of Expert Testimony and Disclosure
Another aspect of the informed consent issue that has
changed since the statute's enactment is the role of expert testimony. 2 Prior to the passage of the statute, courts, from their
pro-patient posture, took the position that a patient's cause of
action could be successfully established independent of expert
testimony.253 Courts chose not to look at the medical community's standard of practice in determining whether the patient
had a right to sue for the physician's failure to obtain informed
consent.25 4 Instead, the courts adopted the Canterbury rule, 5
which regarded the medical standard as self-serving and required the guiding criterion for disclosure to be the materiality of
the information to the patient.2 56
The case of Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital"
252 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4401-a (McKinney 1992). Section 4401-a provides that "[a]
motion for judgment at the end of plaintiffs case must be granted as to any cause of
action for medical malpractice based solely on lack of informed consent if the plaintiff has failed to adduce expert medical testimony in support of the alleged qualitative insufficiency of the consent." Id; see also Retkwa v. Orentreich, 584 N.Y.S.2d
710, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (explaining that "New York requires expert medical testimony to establish a prima facie case of lack of informed consent").
53 See Zeleznik v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hosp., 366 N.Y.S.2d
163, 171 (App.
Div. 1975).
254 See Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 344 N.Y.S.2d 552, 559 (App.
Div. 1973) (stating
that expert medical testimony should not be used to determine required level of
disclosure).
25 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In
Canterbury, the court
stated:
no basis [exists] for operation of the special medical standard where the
physician's activity does not bring his medical knowledge and skills peculiarly into play.... The decision to unveil the patient's condition and the
chances as to remediation ... is ofttimes a non-medical judgment and, if so,
is a decision outside the ambit of the special standard. Where that is the
situation, professional custom hardly furnishes the legal criterion for
measuring the physician's responsibility to reasonably inform his patient of
the options and the hazards as to treatment.
Id. at 785 (citations omitted). The court laid to rest the need for expert testimony in
non-medical areas of judgment, namely, the scope of disclosure requirements. Id.
Accordingly, it is submitted that this judicial effort circumvented the medical profession's "conspiracy of silence." Plaintiffs were able to establish a prima facie case
without setting forth expert testimony as to what a reasonable physician would do
under similar circumstances.
2" Garone v. Roberts' Tech. & Trade Sch., Inc., 366 N.Y.S.2d 129, 134 (App. Div.
1975) (adopting reasoning of Canterbury court by finding that "[tihe decision as to
what is or is not material is a human judgment ... which does not necessarily require the assistance of the medical profession").
'r, 366 N.Y.S.2d 163 (App. Div. 1975).
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went even further in disregarding the need for expert medical
opinion when it held that such testimony is not only unnecessary
but is also improper."5 The court's rationale was predicated on
the assumption that
[tiestimony of a specific medical community standard as to the
risks to be divulged is necessarily permeated with self-interest
in its attempt to state as concrete what is so nebulous.... The
distractions of a battle between medical witnesses of the opposing parties as to an alleged community standard of disclosed
risks have no place in a rational attempt to learn which risks,
tested by general considerations of reasonable disclosure under
all circumstances, should have been disclosed as materially affecting the patient's decision whether to proceed with the
treatment. 9
The Zeleznik court found that since the jury was in a better
position to decide the issue of materiality of information, the jury
was not bound by the conclusions of the medical community.26 °
In spite of this history of cases disregarding the need for expert testimony, the 1975 enactment of the medical malpractice
statute re-introduced the requirement of expert medical opinion
in support of a cause of action based on the failure to obtain informed consent.261
E. Application of Statute and Retroactivity of Application
Interesting issues arose in cases where alleged acts of medical malpractice occurred prior to the statutory mandate of 1975
but the degree of disclosure was challenged by the plaintiffpatient subsequent to that date. These cases typically involved a
defendant's failure to obtain informed consent in factual situations that gave rise to questions of emerging trends in medical

" Id. at 171.
2 Id. at 170-71 (citations omitted).
...
Id. at 170.
"'i N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4401-a (McKinney 1992). The statute states that the defendant
is entitled to summary judgment at the close of the plaintiffs case if the plaintiff
fails to produce "expert medical testimony in support of the alleged qualitative insufficiency of the consent." Id. For cases involving summary judgment under
C.P.L.R. 4401-a, see Hylick v. Halweil, 492 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 1985)
(unnecessary surgery); Lipsius v. White, 458 N.Y.S.2d 928 (App. Div. 1983)
(permanent damage to right hand and unnecessary surgery); and Twitchell v.
MacKay, 434 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 1980) (knee injury caused by physician manipulating knee).
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practice.262 For example, two such cases involved premature infants to whom prolonged oxygen was administered, resulting in a
disease known as retrolental fibroplasia (RLF) and causing
blindness. 6 Although questions were raised at the time as to
the safety of liberal administration of oxygen, this medical practice continued.2" In both cases, parental consent was not obtained for the placement of the premature infants in a higher
than average oxygen environment.2 65 In this manner, the issues
of an acceptable standard of care and of the failure to obtain informed consent became intertwined.2 66
267 the court
In Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital,
agreed
that the issue of informed consent was inseparable from the
malpractice question.2 6' Further, the court asserted that the
mere fact that the issue of informed consent was not presented
to a New York court until 1965 did not relieve doctors of such
duty prior to that date. 6 9 In fact, prior to the statutory mandate
of 1975, doctors were certainly not free "to expose their patients
to unwarranted risks without first obtaining their consent."27 ° At
all times, the requirement to obtain the patient's consent was a
recognized responsibility of the physician.272 Consequently, in
Burton, the defendant-physician was legally mandated to explain
272
the risks of treatment to the parents of the premature infant.
The general consent granted by the parents of the patient was
2 See, e.g., Kuncio v. Millard Fillmore Hosp., 499 N.Y.S.2d 525 (App. Div. 1986)

(involving medical malpractice action by premature twins against hospital for failure to obtain informed consent from parents before administering high concentration of oxygen); Flores v. Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 490 N.Y.S.2d 770 (App. Div.
1985); Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1982).
262 See, e.g., Flores,490 N.Y.S.2d at 771; Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
264 See Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (explaining that medical profession was divided as to whether practice should continue).
265 See Flores,490 N.Y.S.2d at 771; Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
2"6See Flores,490 N.Y.S.2d at 772; Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
267 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1982).
268 Id. at 880 ("In the factual context in which it is presented, the issue of informed consent is, to an extent, virtually inseparable from the malpractice question.").
219Id. at 881 ("Because a New York court was not squarely confronted with
the
issue until 1965 does not mean that the duty did not exist before then.").
270 Id.
211 In 1914, Judge Cardozo recognized this duty in Schloendorff
v. New York
Hospital by stating that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body ...." 211 N.Y. 125, 129
(1914).
272 Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 879.

19971

INFORMED CONSENT

inadequate because it simply authorized " 'the doctors ... to give
such treatment and medication to [their] son which ... becomes
necessary while he is a patient in the ... [hiospital.' ,,273
The court found that the physicians could not protect themselves with the defense of acceptable medical practices because
studies had indicated that increased oxygen was both unnecessary and dangerous. 274 This suggests that the defendants were
required to inform parents not only of how they were planning to
treat their child, but also on the then current controversy regarding oxygen treatment for premature infants. Hence, the parents
should have been made aware of the emerging concerns regarding the use of oxygen and that their baby was being placed in a
study concerning the effects of oxygen on RLF, which would require the infant to receive prolonged, high concentrations of oxygen. Also, even apart from the written consent, the parents
should have been told of the risks involved and the options
available before their baby was put into the experimental study.275
The case of Flores v. FlushingHospital and Medical Center
also involved the administration of oxygen to a premature infant
which resulted in blindness. However, in Flores, the baby was
not part of an experimental study, as was the case in Burton. In
Flores, evidence was presented to show that without such continuous use of oxygen, the baby would have died or suffered
brain damage. 27' Nevertheless, the parents of baby Flores were
never informed about the risks of oxygen use and the possible
consequence of blindness.2 77 If they were informed of such risks,
would the parents then have been reduced to choosing between
death or blindness? This issue was ultimately irrelevant because
the court remanded the case for a new trial on the grounds that
the charge to the jury was too confusing and therefore mistaken
as to the element of causation.27 8
Relationship Between Statute and Common Law
The New York judiciary has taken the position that the 1975
medical malpractice statute did not impose a new duty upon the

F.

at 880.
Id.
275 490 N.Y.S.2d 770 (App. Div. 1985).
276 Id. at 771.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 773.
2" Id.

274
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doctor to disclose risks, diagnoses and treatment protocols and to
obtain informed consent.279 Instead, courts have found that the
statute merely
codified existing law and made changes in only
28
some cases. 0
(i)

Nature of Cause of Action
In Hughson v. St. FrancisHospital of Port Jervis,"' the issue
was raised as to whom the cause of action for failure to obtain informed consent belonged: does the action involve the independent duty flowing between doctor and patient and therefore an independent claim for which the infant could seek redress and
recovery for himself, or is the infant's action derivative of the
mother's cause of action?2 2 If the cause of action based on failure
to obtain informed consent is an independent one, then the parent need not be a formal party to the action.2 Conversely, if the
cause of action is derivative of the parent's action, then that parent must be a formal party to the action on behalf of the infant
for prenatal injuries arising out of the failure to obtain the parent's informed consent. The Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the infant's cause of action is viable and independent although the status of the child's incompetence to give
binding consent to any medical services must be given through
the parent.2 8 Therefore, a minor can not be denied protection
under section 2805-d.285
27 See supra note 267 and accompanying text; see also Laskowitz v. Ciba
Vision
Corp., 632 N.Y.S.2d 845, 849 (App. Div. 1995) (stating that Public Health Law
§ 2805-d did not repeal common law doctrine of informed consent.).
288 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
21459 N.Y.S.2d 814 (App. Div. 1983).

at 815.
In Woods v. Lancet, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that a child
may recover for injuries inflicted while the child was a viable fetus. 303 N.Y. 349,
357 (1951); see also Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (1953) ("If the child born
after an injury sustained at any period of his pre-natal life can prove the effect on
him of the tort ... he makes out a right to recover.").
2Id.

21

24 Hughson, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 817.

282Id.
[S]ection 2805-d cannot be read to deny such minor or legally incompetent
patients protection against incompetent advice or unauthorized treatment
merely because they are not the persons from whom the law requires consent.... [Ilt ignores the realities of modern obstetrical practice to deny the
infant in utero independent protection against incompetent medical advice
.... tIlt is absolutely vital that the cause of action belong to the infant, born
alive, as well as [tlo the mother.... To deny an independent cause of action
to the infant is to deny any recovery for direct physical injury, for the
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(ii) Comparative Negligence Defense
In Bellier v. Bazan, 6 the plaintiff brought an action for
damages alleging that she had not been informed adequately of
the risks of a breast reduction procedure, which caused her to
sustain harsh discomfort in addition to severe and unnecessary
scarring.28 At the trial level, the jury found that her negligence
contributed to the damages she sustained. 288 In concluding that
plaintiff was comparatively at fault, the jury reduced her recoverable damages by fifteen percent. 2 The plaintiff appealed to set
aside the jury's reduction of her damages on the grounds that
"comparative fault [could not] be used as a defense in an action
sounding in lack of informed consent." 29 She further argued
that because the action for lack of an informed consent was
statutorily circumscribed by the legislature, the only defenses
available should be those codified in the statute itself.2 1 The
Appellate Division disagreed and found that actions in medical
malpractice are like other actions in negligence, and therefore
the doctrine of mitigation of damages is similarly available to
actions for lack of informed consent as for other medical malpractice actions.292
(iii) Admissibility of Habit Evidence
The cause of action based on a lack of informed consent is
now firmly embedded in our judicial tradition as a negligence
action. 293 Not surprisingly, the question of the admissibility of
mother cannot recover in her own right for the infant's injuries.... The doctrine of informed consent may not be so rendered nugatory in pregnancyrelated cases.
Id. at 817-18.
2 478 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
'8 Id. at 563.
283 Id.

Id. Comparative fault in the medical malpractice context has since been recognized in other New York cases. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Smallberg, 637 N.Y.S.2d 115
(App. Div. 1996) (recognizing the possibility of reduction in amount of jury award,
but noting there was insufficient evidence of plaintiffs negligence).
2" Bellier, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
219

291 Id.
2 Id. ("Although lack of informed consent is a distinct cause of action which
should be separately pleaded in the complaint, it remains a form of medical malpractice where liability is determined by the standard of a 'reasonable medical
practitioner.") (citations omitted).
213See Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561, 564 (App. Div. 1980) (stating
that
conduct of parties should be examined under negligence analysis).
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habit evidence in a cause of action for informed consent has been
raised. In Rigie v. Goldman,294 the plaintiff was advised by her
doctors to have an impacted wisdom tooth removed, and she
agreed.295 As a result of the surgery, the plaintiff suffered from a
permanent condition known as paresthesia-a numbness of the
lip, chin or tongue, which is caused by injury to a nerve within
the oral cavity.296
The defendant, who specialized in oral and maxillofacial
surgery, and his dental assistant were permitted to testify as to
the dentist's routine practice, which had developed over nineteen
years.297 According to the defendant, that habitual routine included telling patients about the risks and complications of wisdom tooth extraction, as well as warnings that no alternative to
extraction existed.298 The doctor's dental assistant confirmed his
testimony and stated that she had witnessed hundreds of such
surgical procedures that were performed exactly the way the defendant-dentist had described them.299 The Appellate Division
permitted the admission of such habit evidence as circumstantial
evidence. °0 The court followed the New York Court of Appeals
decision in Halloran v. Virginia Chemicals,"1 which was the first

case in which the Court of Appeals allowed habit evidence of repetitive conduct in personal injury actions. 2 In the opinion of
the Rigie court, a medical malpractice action was like any other
negligence action. According to the court, the habit evidence at
issue must be examined and where the evidence of habit
"exhibits a uniformity of response and a sufficient number of instances of the repetitive conduct, it is admissible."" 3

29'
543 N.Y.S.2d 983 (App. Div. 1989).
295 Id.
at 983.
291 Id. at 984.
297 Id.
298 Id.
299

Id.

200

Id. (noting that general rule allows evidence of habitual behavior as circum-

stantial evidence).
30141 N.Y.2d 386 (1977).
202 Until Halloranv. Virginia Chemicals, the general rule in New York was that
habitual conduct was inadmissible when offered in a negligence case to raise an inference of the exercise of the same amount of apparent caution or incaution on the
occasion in question. RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE
(11th ed. 1995).
...
Rigie, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 986-87.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The New York statute, which was enacted twenty years ago
in a climate of uncertainty, has received careful evaluation and
fairly consistent judicial interpretation. At this juncture, the
case law uniformly deems a cause of action for the failure to obtain informed consent to be an action in negligence. A successful
medical malpractice action today must be supported by expert
medical testimony.
The statute has imposed on the New York medical community the twin duties of providing the patient with that degree of
information that furthers the patient's right to selfdetermination, as well as the duty to obtain the patient's informed consent. The requirements for providing disclosure and
for obtaining the patient's consent are enunciated in the statute.
The statute mandates an objective test that both the provider
and the patient must meet. Each party's role in executing his
respective mandate, as defined by the statute, is determined by
comparing the acts of the party with what the reasonably prudent person would do in similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the
statute infuses an element of subjectivity with regard to the patient's informational needs and concedes that an appropriate
evaluation by the patient can occur only when that particular
patient's unique requests have been met.
The jurisprudence has evolved to require the duty to obtain
consent only from the provider who furnishes the treatment.
Any other provider in the medical hierarchy is not burdened by
the statutory requirements unless he participates in the course
of treatment. The case law interpretation of the "foreseeable
risks" that must be revealed by provider to patient has been uneven. The case law is uniform in its requirement that the provider's mandate be pro-active and not merely reactive. The provider's role is more than merely an educational one since it is
through the provider's digesting of technical material that the
patient becomes empowered to make an appropriate evaluation
of his course of treatment. To sit back and answer an occasional
query of the patient will not satisfy the requirements of the legislation.
To the extent that certain risks occur only infrequently, the
case law is divided. Some cases require disclosure of those risks
that occur at a one percent frequency while other cases suggest
that a risk that occurs in only two or three cases in a million

590
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need not be revealed.
Similarly, the case law is uniform in its analysis of disclosure requirements pertinent to those areas of medicine that
evince the quality of emerging medical trends and standards of
practice. The medical community defines the test for disclosure.
Where that standard cannot be discerned, the disclosure to the
patient need not be individualized, but it may instead be determined by that to which the reasonably prudent person in similar
circumstances would have agreed.
In conclusion, the last two decades since the passage of the
medical malpractice statute have marked a critical period for
judicial analysis and interpretation of the statutory provisions.
The case law has since evolved into a body of law with fairly uniform markers for the practicing health care professional.

